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S E C T O R
Key Points
· Sharing and leveraging lessons learned from mis-
takes is an important but underutilized resource to 
improve philanthropic investments and nonprofit 
performance.
· Philanthropic mistakes extend beyond the results 
of program evaluations to include questions of 
mission, role, investment strategies, and imple-
mentation.
· Distinguishing between “constructive” and “non-
constructive” mistakes focuses attention on those 
factors that shape the outcomes for even the most 
well-designed investments.
· Sharing and reflecting upon mistakes has the 
potential to improve philanthropic capacities for 
anticipation, learning, and adaptation.
· Philanthropy must recognize the sometimes blurry 
lines between success and failure, constructive 
and nonconstructive mistakes, and philanthropic 
and nonprofit sector accountability.
Robert Giloth, Ph.D., and Susan Gewirtz, Annie E. Casey Foundation
Philanthropy and Mistakes: 
An Untapped Resource
Introduction
An astute and longtime observer of the philan-
thropic world scolded foundations several years 
ago for not consistently sharing their lessons about 
investments that did not work as intended — what 
some might call “failures” or “mistakes” (Frumkin, 
2006). This call for transparency was not simply 
about the need for accountability; it represented 
the belief that foundations collectively are missing 
an important opportunity to improve the design 
and implementation of their social investments.1
Not all foundation mistakes are the same, but 
three aspects of philanthropic investing are 
mistakes that can be avoided. First, foundations 
mismatch their reach and their resources. They 
sometimes overreach in the ambition of their 
investments, thinking they alone can address the 
complexity and scale of important social issues. 
Conversely, foundations sometimes underper-
form by not taking substantial risks on behalf 
of change and innovation. Second, foundations 
sometimes ignore the need to generate knowl-
edge, by failing to commit to and invest in evalu-
ation, self-reflection, and communicating lessons 
to relevant audiences. Third, foundations are 
sometimes not transparent about their knowledge 
of what works and what does not.
Not as easy to avoid are “constructive failures” 
— those mistakes that occur in spite of thought-
1 This article draws on Giloth (2004, 2007).
ful design, implementation, and evaluation by 
foundations and their nonprofit partners (Cohen 
& Gooch, 1991). These failures are unexpected 
given the state of theory, experience, and best ad-
vice. Such failures call into question foundations’ 
assumptions about roles, problems, strategic 
interventions, implementation, partners, indica-
tors of success, and methods of documentation. 
Constructive failures provide invaluable insights 
into problems and solutions, laying the ground-
work for the next generation of investments. 
Constructive mistakes can be acts of commis-
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sion or omission — that is, opportunities that are 
pursued or neglected. 
Philanthropy has recently accelerated its sharing 
and reflecting on foundation failures (Strom, 2007). 
The Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Chicago 
Community Trust set the tone in the 1990s with 
their critical reflections about major community-
building initiatives (Frumkin, 2006). More recently, 
the Irvine, Gates, Heinz, Hewlett, and McConnell 
Clark foundations have shared what did not work 
in specific education, youth, and community-
building investments (Strom, 2007). In addition, 
the 2008 Council on Foundations national confer-
ence in Washington, D.C., featured a workshop on 
“The Advantage of Sharing Failures.” 
This article discusses how foundations and their 
nonprofit partners might think about failure and 
share their hard-learned lessons. We first distin-
guish among different types of mistakes and how 
they relate to specific types of foundation invest-
ments. The article then discusses three examples 
that represent different types of mistakes that 
foundations and their nonprofit partners make. 
Finally, we offer lessons to foundations about 
adapting, learning, and sharing in the face of 
failure. The overarching argument of this article 
is that foundations face certain dilemmas in their 
grantmaking that are related to mistakes and that 
need to be acknowledged and reflected on.
Thinking About Mistakes
A rich and somewhat iconoclastic wave of lit-
erature has begun to explore the power mistakes 
have to generate innovation in the nonprofit 
sector (Giloth, 2004; Brehm, 2008). Mistakes are 
valued in some ways, even though culturally many 
nonprofit organizations find it difficult to talk 
about and acknowledge failure. In the business 
world, for example, one’s prospects are related to 
one’s resume of constructive mistakes or failures, 
regardless of whether this is made explicit. Entre-
preneurs pick themselves up and try again. 
There are several types of common mistakes2:
2 Robert Hughes of the Robert Woods Johnson Founda-
tion divides constructive failures into “valid failures” and 
failures resulting from “environmental and policy” shifts.
The hubris of acting alone or thinking one can •	
change the world, taking on challenges beyond 
the scope of any one investor or stakeholder 
(Wooster, 2006). 
“Groupthink” (individuals in a group thinking •	
too much alike) blinds decision makers to alter-
native courses of action and contrary evidence, 
sometimes leading them to folly and tragedy. 
Losing focus and failing to pay attention •	
enough to do routine tasks well.
Trial-and-error mistakes, which stem from •	
prototyping new, untested ideas, resulting in 
a high likelihood of failure. Different types 
of trial-and-error mistakes occur at differ-
ent phases of the development or innovation 
cycle, whether in model-building or scaling-
up demonstrations. Knowing where you are 
in the innovation cycle and what you need 
to learn is critical for creating durable social 
inventions.
Unintended consequences of social action •	
(McKnight, 1995). Mistakes of this kind are 
especially apparent when the goal of the invest-
ment is to change systems — educational, eco-
logical, or community based. As systems adjust 
or try to maintain the status quo in response 
to the intervention, the repercussions of trying 
to do good might be seen as violating the basic 
rule “do no harm.”
 
Philanthropic Dilemmas — Mission and 
Culture
Foundations contribute to mistake making in two 
fundamental ways.
The first has to do with their mission and culture, 
as embodied in the roles and investment ap-
proaches of foundations. The very nature of 
foundation resources and governance as well as 
their high public profile can lead to some predict-
able mistakes. 
Part of the nature of foundations is their ideologi-
cal assumptions or preferences, which can narrow 
the design and effectiveness of social investments, 
although in the aggregate they may stimulate a 
healthy competition of ideas. Many times, their 
ideology leads to “either/or” thinking rather 
than to “both/and” thinking, thereby limiting the 
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reach, adaptability, and effectiveness of founda-
tion investments. 
The old story of the hedgehog and the fox, 
reinterpreted in 2001 in Collins’ Good to Great, 
underscores the advantages and perils of foun-
dations doing only a few things well, compared 
to having multiple irons in the fire. Foxes know 
many things and are always trying out new ap-
proaches; hedgehogs have one unifying theory 
and are always setting specific goals to move 
the world in that one direction. This parable 
plays out in complex and unexpected ways, 
however, because even foundations that do 
multiple things — the foxes — may do them in 
only one or two ways, such as only taking over-
the-transom proposals. Likewise, the founda-
tion that appears to emulate the hedgehog may, 
in fact, use multiple philanthropic approaches, 
such as grants, social investments, consulting, 
operating programs, technical assistance, and 
advocacy. 
Similarly, it is too simple to contrast the active 
social investor and the reactive grantmaker. The 
investor may be expertise-driven, drawing on 
favored experts to design foundation investments 
and solicit partners. The reactive grantmaker, on 
the other hand, may place more emphasis on and 
value in external entrepreneurs and organization-
al capacity in addition to the good idea, and thus 
be more open to the whole world. 
Finally, one might think that the transparent 
grantmaker is a clear winner over more secre-
tive foundations. While true overall — and being 
transparent about mistakes, after all, is the focus 
of this article — the secretive grantmaker may 
actually be more humble and prefer a behind-the-
scenes approach, while the transparent grantmak-
er may sometimes just be a better communicator, 
not necessarily a more effective one. 
Philanthropic Dilemmas — Operational 
Strategies
The second major way in which foundations con-
tribute to mistakes is in how they implement their 
mission through their investments and how they 
carry out social policy initiatives. As with mis-
sion and culture, foundations differ dramatically 
in investment approaches, but no one approach 
guarantees a consistent escape from mistakes. 
Rather, these differences lead to different kinds of 
mistakes on the ground.
Whether foundation initiatives follow a blue-
print or grow and adapt investments organically 
is a perennial problem, especially for national 
foundations that invest large sums of money 
with relatively little local knowledge and high 
expectations. Another version of this challenge 
is the branded single-foundation effort versus 
collaborative grantmaking with local funders, 
which inevitably requires more flexibility to meet 
the needs of all investors. Still another variant is 
a program replication versus a design replication, 
which tries to transplant design ideas into new 
contexts. 
Blueprinting is rigid in many respects, but defin-
ing guidelines and metrics is essential for generat-
ing serious knowledge, especially knowledge that 
can be compared with results elsewhere. At the 
One might think that the 
transparent grantmaker is a 
clear winner over more secretive 
foundations. While true overall 
— and being transparent about 
mistakes, after all, is the focus 
of this article — the secretive 
grantmaker may actually be more 
humble and prefer a behind-
the-scenes approach, while 
the transparent grantmaker 
may sometimes just be a better 
communicator.
Giloth and Gewirtz
118 THE FoundationReview
same time, the organic, local approach may be a 
substitute for a lack of ambition or may simply be 
renaming what is already being done. Although 
blueprinting can provide a focused way to cut 
through competing local agendas, wide local 
ownership is needed in the long run if successful 
investments are to be sustained.
Another version of the blueprint/organic chal-
lenge relates to grantee engagement and account-
ability. High engagement with grantees, favored 
by venture investors, promises “added value” 
but at its worst descends into technical interfer-
ence and micromanagement. Low engagement 
may signal that making the grant was the high 
point of the relationship or may communicate 
the message that grantees should only come back 
when they have results or a serious problem to 
talk about. Accountability, as we have seen, can 
be present or absent with varying intensities of 
engagement.
The duration of foundation investments can be 
controversial as well. Many foundations use a 
one- to three-year grant cycle, which doesn’t 
even give grantees long enough to fail. Without 
failing, sometimes it’s difficult to learn and suc-
ceed. On the other hand, longer term, five- to 
eight-year initiatives can discourage urgency 
and unconsciously create the incentive for drift 
and lack of focus, not only for implementers 
but also for foundations whose program officers 
eventually move on to other opportunities. Most 
foundations want results, but they also want 
to help the most underserved populations and 
communities. Ironically, these objectives can 
pull nonprofits in different directions. High-
performing nonprofits often resist blueprinting, 
and yet, they are the most capable of fulfilling 
foundation expectations for ideas, results, and 
scale. On the other hand, places of need and the 
organizations that serve them tend to be more 
willing to adopt foundation blueprints and put 
up less resistance to foundation knowledge and 
assistance. But in too many cases, they cannot 
deliver on the results.
There is no one tried-and-true way of doing ef-
fective grantmaking, although various advocates 
would like us to think so. Mistakes occur no 
matter what the approach, especially when an 
organization follows an approach rigidly. Founda-
tions would be best served by understanding the 
dilemmas all grantmaking poses and by being 
aware of the potential pitfalls and mistakes. 
Examples of Philanthropic Mistakes
Three examples of foundation mistakes illustrate 
the dilemmas of grantmaking. None of these dif-
ferently sized and structured cases fits the image 
of the big, single foundation-generated initiative 
that failed. What these examples highlight are the 
more nuanced partnerships between nonprofit 
grantees and foundations. Who makes and owns 
each operational or strategic mistake is a matter 
of perspective, especially when projects have a 
blueprinting component. A cross-cutting theme 
in all of these mistakes is a failure to evaluate, 
document, and communicate.
All in the Neighborhood?
When failures are not made transparent or when 
they are not analyzed and digested fully, they 
endure below the surface of community affairs, 
popping up when least expected to do more dam-
age. In Chicago, when foundations began talking 
about forming a funder collaborative for work-
force development, foundation program officers 
raised the specter of a past funder-collaborative 
failure, the Austin Labor Force Intermediary, or 
ALFI, as an impediment to the new collaboration. 
Unfortunately, almost all of the evaluations, foun-
dation files, and key players related to this effort 
were nowhere to be found.  
There is no one tried-and-true way 
of doing effective grantmaking, 
although various advocates would 
like us to think so. Mistakes occur 
no matter what the approach, 
especially when an organization 
follows an approach rigidly.
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During the early stages of the design and imple-
mentation of the Casey Foundation’s Jobs Initia-
tive (JI) in the mid-1990s, we made a number of 
grants to facilitate our learning about the chal-
lenges of workforce innovation on the ground. 
South Shore Bank and its nonprofit affiliate, The 
Neighborhood Institute (TNI), approached us to 
invest in ALFI, a new and ambitious project that 
was part of The Austin Initiative, Shore Bank’s 
expansion into the west-side Chicago neighbor-
hood of Austin.
The protracted, multiyear planning process for 
ALFI produced a price tag of several million dol-
lars per year for a very ambitious initiative. The 
key assumption informing ALFI was the percep-
tion that Chicago’s west side suffered from a dis-
connection between available jobs in the neigh-
borhood and neighborhood job seekers. This 
contrasted with the growing belief that urban job 
seekers should be connected to concentrations of 
regional jobs. Research showed that few west-side 
residents worked for neighborhood businesses, 
mostly small manufacturers, yet these firms 
employed many people in the aggregate. ALFI 
represented a new vision of community building 
— constructing a preparation pipeline to connect 
residents to neighborhood jobs, which would en-
hance local income and partnerships that would 
contribute to rebuilding the whole neighborhood. 
ALFI would invest in both the supply and demand 
sides of the labor market as well as in bridging 
mechanisms that would bring them together.
ALFI failed to get traction after several years and 
ultimately closed down. There were many reasons 
for this failure. Early on, the over-the-top budget 
was cut in half to what was seen as a more appro-
priate size, although the program’s complex and 
ambitious theory of change was left relatively un-
touched. The Ford, MacArthur, Casey, and Mott 
foundations joined other local funders without 
sufficient public sector buy-in, except for targeted 
projects that launched ALFI as a welfare-to-work 
project. Foundations should have questioned the 
overall feasibility more closely and considered re-
vising the theory of change when the budget was 
cut. A part of the problem was that funders were 
attracted by a high-performing grantee, South 
Shore Bank, even though community building 
and workforce development in the Austin neigh-
borhood were not its strengths. Foundations went 
along with the project and, perhaps because ALFI 
really was not central to their portfolios, took 
their eyes off the ball.
A related problem was that, despite the rheto-
ric of partnerships, ALFI essentially created a 
new organization and brought in new executive 
staff. The Austin community certainly required 
expanded nonprofit capacity, maybe more than 
existing nonprofits realized, but ALFI failed to 
take advantage of significant experience already 
in the community, especially related to working 
with local industries and designing and imple-
menting job-training and placement programs. 
At the same time, ALFI lost some degree of focus 
by having to work with so many neighborhood 
nonprofits, not all of whom had the capacity or 
interest in collaborating.
Attempting to bring off an ambitious agenda with 
insufficient funding and without strong commu-
nity and public-sector partners ultimately undid 
ALFI, and mixed goals didn’t help. Was ALFI try-
ing to grow local businesses, especially minority 
businesses, through technical assistance, mentor-
ing, and access to capital? Was ALFI trying to 
maximize the hiring of neighborhood residents 
into local jobs and careers? Was Shore Bank try-
ing to rebuild the neighborhood? ALFI needed to 
do all of the above, but having one start-up orga-
nization simultaneously doing all of these things 
in the same neighborhood would have been a 
tough charge, even for the highest performing 
organization.
Finally, key design assumptions proved to be 
incorrect or difficult to build on. ALFI was unable 
to place many local residents in local jobs and did 
not mount a larger effort to place people in jobs 
outside of Austin. Residents lacked requisite skills 
and readiness, and, as it turned out, firms lacked 
jobs and an openness to creating community 
employment opportunities. 
In some sense, ALFI was another case of a theory-
driven investment by a high-performing grantee 
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that could not or would not adapt. ALFI pushed 
forward despite a lack of resources and in the face 
of skeptical questions. Funders invested in a for-
mative review of ALFI by Rainbow Research, Inc., 
that raised many issues and challenges, but key 
questions were not asked or answered until staff 
exited or funding dried up (Rainbow Research, 
Inc.,1995). Funders gradually peeled off, leaving 
ALFI to make its own way on a downward path. 
Foundations failed to give a high-performing 
grantee appropriate feedback: that ALFI’s design 
was too complicated and infeasible in many 
respects. But just as important, no one told the 
complete story of ALFI, so knowledge about how 
to link community building, workforce devel-
opment, and economic opportunity suffered. 
It would have been a cautionary tale for many 
subsequent initiatives, including those efforts to 
connect job seekers to regional jobs. That lack of 
documentation and reflection about this experi-
ence was perhaps the biggest mistake in the end.
The Dangers of Outcome Measures3
The nonprofit world has had an ongoing debate 
about the importance of results and outcome-
based thinking. Although most agree that using 
data, setting targets, and managing for results are 
critical elements of accountability, continuous 
improvement, and organizational learning, there 
are many concerns as well. For example, does a 
focus on results crowd out innovation and drown 
out new voices or important stories? The mistake 
we focus on is not anticipating the unintended 
consequences of establishing “robust” indicators 
of program success. 
The Casey Foundation’s Jobs Initiative illustrates 
the problem of how choosing complicated or 
higher standards can lead to effective programs’ 
looking worse than other programs in their com-
munities and to evaluations that minimize results. 
The JI was an eight-year, six-city, $30-million ef-
fort to connect low-income, urban communities 
to good jobs and regional economies. It sought 
to address the poor performance of much of the 
3 Drawn from Gewirtz (2007).
employment-training field by adopting higher 
standards and evidenced-based models of pro-
gram design such as the Center for Employment 
Training (CET). A nonexperimental evaluation 
design showed income and retention gains and 
underscored the importance of integrating hu-
man service supports, work readiness training, 
education and training, and targeting the right 
jobs (Abt Associates & New School University, 
2003)
The JI defined and counted job placements as 
those that had a starting wage of $7 per hour and 
were full time. In the mid-1990s this wage was 
above minimum wage, and several sites set the 
wage threshold even higher. For several sites that 
were serving very hard-to-employ individuals, 
this meant that many of their placements did not 
count, which lowered their placement rate among 
people enrolled in the program. 
The JI focused on keeping participants employed 
for one year, a longer term retention goal than 
the existing standard of three months, to focus 
investments on long-run labor force attachment 
and success. Moreover, the JI adopted a conserva-
tive definition of retention, requiring workers to 
remain in the same- or higher-wage job and have 
only short interruptions in work, and discount-
ing participants who dropped out of sight, thus 
lowering retention numbers.
Though the use of “robust” metrics encouraged 
learning about job-retention strategies, it took 
place in a somewhat self-contained hothouse 
environment that did not reflect what other inves-
tors required. Rather than encouraging other 
public and private investors to change their ways 
and adopt more meaningful indicators, the JI 
inadvertently encouraged its sites to keep double 
books to satisfy the demands of JI funders and 
others who were not involved. 
In deconstructing this mistake, the Casey 
Foundation came to believe that it was correct 
in setting ambitious targets with precise and 
robust measures, but it erred by establishing 
performance measures in isolation from other 
workforce actors in the JI communities. By 
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recognizing that the low-income earners and job 
seekers that JI sites would be serving often had 
work experience but limited continuous attach-
ment, it made sense to push for longer term labor 
market attachment. Recent research suggesting 
that wage progression for low-income earners 
often involves changing jobs has also affirmed the 
decision to allow for multiple jobs with short gaps 
in between to be taken into account when defin-
ing retention. 
The Casey Foundation, however, did not suffi-
ciently take into account the competitive environ-
ment in which workforce development programs 
operate. The 1990s were particularly eventful 
years for changes in federal policy related to wel-
fare and workforce. Policy shifts reduced fund-
ing for education and training and signaled an 
emphasis on work-first strategies. JI sites, while 
receiving substantial philanthropic resources, still 
needed to leverage public funding and foster part-
nerships, which in turn required them to demon-
strate their comparative effectiveness. 
The JI was successful in many respects, and 
the focus on retention drove better results in a 
number of sites. What was not so successful was 
getting workforce systems and other nonprofits 
to adopt more robust retention measures. The 
JI’s key metric was not adopted more broadly, 
and using it ended up disadvantaging grantees. 
This was a lost opportunity to engage in a debate 
about the preferred outcomes of workforce 
investments. Lack of common metrics remains a 
big problem in the workforce field. This mo-
tivated the Casey Foundation to invest in the 
Benchmarking project of Public/Private Ven-
tures as a next-generation effort to grapple with 
workforce metrics.
A Goal Too Far?
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is argu-
ably the most successful and popular US poverty 
alleviation program of the past several decades 
(Annie E. Casey Foundation [AECF], 2007). 
Started under President Ford and expanded dur-
ing with 1990s, the EITC now represents a federal 
investment of more than $40 billion, an average 
of about $1,600 per eligible household, and lifts 
five million families out of poverty each year 
(AECF, 2007). The EITC rewards working adults 
in families with children and tapers off as house-
hold income rises. Although estimates of overall 
EITC eligibility and take-up are challenging, given 
data availability and changing economic condi-
tions, a commonsense rule of thumb is that about 
80% of eligible households take advantage of the 
EITC. Take-up is lower for those with the lowest 
incomes, the most isolated, and non-English 
speakers.
The delivery mechanism for most EITC recipi-
ents is private tax preparers, such as H&R Block, 
that charge several hundred dollars to prepare 
and submit returns and frequently lure EITC 
recipients into taking out rapid anticipation loans 
(RALs), which are high-cost loans that allow for 
immediate access to tax refunds. By contrast, 
the VITA free tax-preparation movement relies 
on volunteers and public and private financing 
and accounts for about 5% of EITC submissions. 
Twenty-three states have legislated state-level 
Though the use of “robust” metrics 
encouraged learning about job-
retention strategies, it took place 
in a somewhat self-contained 
hothouse environment that did 
not reflect what other investors 
required. Rather than encouraging 
other public and private investors 
to change their ways and adopt 
more meaningful indicators, the JI 
inadvertently encouraged its sites 
to keep double books to satisfy the 
demands of JI funders and others 
who were not involved. 
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EITCs, and policy advocates are now seeking to 
deepen the federal credit and expand eligibility to 
noncustodial fathers.
Foundations of all sizes have jumped on the EITC 
bandwagon, supporting every aspect of the work, 
and even forming an EITC Funders Network. 
One of the newest entrants is the United Way 
of America with its Financial Stability Partner-
ship. All of these funders support VITA’s free 
tax-preparation services or other low-cost 
alternatives, and each claims to have had a large 
impact, as measured by tax returns filed and 
money refunded. Some of this reporting hoopla 
is misleading because many EITC recipients are 
merely abandoning paid commercial services in 
favor of free tax services, thus producing savings 
in tax preparation costs and fees. In reality, those 
costs are now simply borne by others, notably 
foundations. The other underreported aspect of 
these big numbers is that almost half of the tax 
returns submitted by tax-credit campaigns are 
from low-income taxpayers who are not EITC-
eligible. This is a worthy service, but it does not 
foster an influx of additional income as promised 
in the advertising for investing in EITC cam-
paigns. Misleading reporting about EITC impact 
is a first mistake.
Many funders, including the Casey Foundation, 
supported EITC campaigns, not only because 
they extended the reach and affordability of an 
important public benefit or work support but 
also because they saw them as mechanisms to 
help low-income people build financial assets. 
The Casey Foundation’s campaign slogans, Earn 
It! Keep It! Save It!, or, more ambitiously, Earn It! 
Keep It! Grow It!, conveyed the hoped-for linkage 
between tax credits and asset building, in which 
families work toward positive net savings. Foun-
dations hoped most optimistically that people 
would take their EITC returns, sign up for Indi-
vidual Development Accounts (IDAs) through 
which a nonprofit would match their savings, and 
eventually buy homes. Saving residents from high 
fees and predatory loans through free tax prepa-
ration would accelerate family asset building, an 
essential element for family economic success. 
Therefore, local tax credit campaigns, at least in 
their start-up phase, crammed their tax sites with 
bank offerings, benefit screenings, financial edu-
cation, and reams of paper about asset-building 
products and services.
As data about campaigns has been gathered 
and reflected on, the challenges of reaching this 
asset-building goal have become more apparent. 
A lot of people getting their taxes done already 
had bank accounts. In addition, those who did 
establish accounts as part of the tax-prepara-
tion service did not always maintain them for 
long and frequently maintained transactional 
banking relationships with alternative financial 
service providers such as private check cashers. 
Most people also did not take up asset-building 
services and products at tax sites at the time of 
tax preparation; they were there merely to get 
their taxes done. Likewise, many people saw 
themselves as taxpayers, not as public benefit 
recipients. Tax sites compiled lists of potential 
participants who might return throughout the 
year for an array of services, but tracking the 
impact of these asset-building services has been 
difficult.
The asset-building mistake resulted, in part, be-
cause of the clunky and time-consuming ways the 
public sector and nonprofits sometimes deliver ser-
vices. Two innovations, however, have the potential 
to overcome the cognitive overload and identity 
issues that, among other factors, seem to prevent 
people from asset building in the EITC moment 
— refund splitting and the availability of online 
savings bond options. Both of these administrative 
and product innovations allow EITC recipients to 
take immediate, albeit small, asset-building steps. 
Yet another lesson was that many EITC recipients 
are ensnared in debt and other financial traps; cam-
paigns need to help people get their heads above 
water before asset building can begin.
Foundations and tax credit campaigns have 
not given up on the goal of asset building, but 
experience has shown that doing so during tax 
preparation season is easier said than done. This 
instructive story, ultimately, is about using data 
and analysis to uncover mistaken assumptions 
and goals and to undertake several rounds of 
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additional innovation and research to get it right. 
In this case, the IRS’s administrative reform, 
pushed by the nonprofit sector, has allowed split 
refunds for savings instruments. It may turn out 
in the long run, however, that the worthy goal of 
encouraging refund splitting and savings is not 
achievable in tax campaigns.
What Can Foundations Improve?
Two cross-cutting themes emerge from the mis-
take examples discussed above — learning and 
adaptation. The ALFI undertaking neither learned 
nor adapted, although it did invest much energy 
and many resources. The JI’s mistake regarding its 
outcome measure limited broad adoption of new 
retention metrics, but the real adaptation only oc-
curred with subsequent foundation investments. 
Finally, the tax campaign and asset-building 
mistake reflect both learning and adaptation, 
although the story is far from complete.
Learning and adaptation should go together. 
Learning emphasizes the ability to seek and ac-
cept information from the environment, includ-
ing information that calls into question operating 
assumptions. Learning is about testing these 
assumptions with some rigor and with attention 
to short-term corrective adjustments and long-
term lessons. Adaptation is the ability to take 
lessons of this sort and to reformulate theories of 
change, project designs, and partnerships. This 
may involve adding or subtracting program ele-
ments, disinvesting in a project or prototype, or 
redesigning partnerships. 
Learning and adaptation represent important 
aspects of ongoing social investment. Indeed, this 
process must ultimately become a part of founda-
tion and initiative culture — the deep-seated 
values and habits shaping everyday activities. 
Foundations can do several things to improve 
learning and adaptation:
Invest directly in the capacity of nonprofits to •	
learn and adapt. Such investments involve rec-
ognizing the extra resources needed to build 
this capacity and to overcome resistance to 
self-evaluation. Long-term investments, toler-
ance for mistakes, peer learning, and investor 
self-evaluation are key ingredients for build-
ing this capacity. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that nonprofit partners often have 
different and perhaps harsher expectations 
and feedback than do foundations when things 
go astray.
Understand the dilemmas created by founda-•	
tion investment designs. Foundations not only 
need to be clear about their assumptions and 
the findings they are based on, they also need 
to engage in discussions with grantees and 
others about the general and specific tensions 
produced by high-engagement investing. 
Anticipate mistakes for different investment •	
arenas and at different stages of investment. 
Many mistakes, including our examples, were 
constructive in most cases, but they were not 
unfamiliar or esoteric. Others had faced these 
problems. Foundations need to be much more 
aware of the types of mistakes likely to stem 
from social innovations, and they must be on 
guard for the unintended consequences that 
inevitably arise. We do not suggest that all mis-
takes can be avoided, but higher levels of rec-
ognition at the outset of investments may help 
mitigate the damage of mistakes and improve 
the process of learning and adaptation.
Learning and adaptation should 
go together. Learning emphasizes 
the ability to seek and accept 
information from the environment, 
including information that 
calls into question operating 
assumptions. Adaptation is the 
ability to take lessons of this 
sort and to reformulate theories 
of change, project designs, and 
partnerships.
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Conclusion
Philanthropy provides high-risk financial re-
sources to help solve messy social problems 
and improve our overall quality of life. This role 
involves not only generating social innovations, 
but also discovering how they can be adopted 
and spread throughout society. There is no tried-
and-true road map for this role, and foundations 
confront multiple dilemmas in mission, culture, 
and operational strategies. Hence, philanthropy 
inevitably makes mistakes.
Some observers question whether foundations 
really take enough risks and whether they are 
open and forthcoming about their mistakes and 
what they have learned. Unfortunately, sharing 
mistakes openly is not always embraced as con-
tributing to or advancing knowledge and effective 
practice. In fact, sharing mistakes — as welcome 
as it can be in the business world — may produce 
negative feedback and contribute to skepticism 
about efficient nonprofit practices. This intoler-
ance of mistakes encourages a resistance to the 
evaluation and documentation that are a founda-
tion for learning. The recent discussion of founda-
tion failures has the potential to reshape these 
perceptions and encourage a more open dialogue 
about investments that didn’t work out.
Sharing mistakes is about both transparency 
and learning. It is at the heart of the knowledge-
generation role of foundations that is so impor-
tant for social innovation and effective policy 
development. Foundations have the unique ability 
to demonstrate how sharing mistakes — or even 
failures — and lessons can be done effectively and 
in a timely manner. Not to take up this challenge 
would be the biggest mistake of all.
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